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     1. Introduction
A considerable body of work exists on smoking addiction related to the price elas-
ticity of demand for cigarettes, as the measure has important implications for
optimal taxation and tobacco control programs.1 Nevertheless, empirical research
has not reached a consensus on the true value of the price elasticity (Chaloupka
and Warner 2000). One possible explanation is the nonlinear structure of cigarette
demand. From a theoretical point of view, Becker et al. (1991) and Grossman
et al. (1998) argued that people diﬀer in their attitudes toward the future, which
in turn aﬀects their cigarette consumption. Those who discount the future more
heavily are likely to become addicted to cigarettes. Thus, the price responses of
cigarette consumption could vary by socioeconomic status, as measured by income,
for example.
Dependence of the demand for cigarettes on income has been veriﬁed empiri-
cally. For example, Fujii (1980) found that cigarette consumption is related posi-
tively to income, indicating that cigarettes are a normal good. On the other hand,
contrasting evidence suggests that a rise in income leads to a decrease in smoking
consumption and hence cigarettes are an inferior good (e.g., Wasserman et al. 1991,
Townsend et al. 1994, and Lanoie and Leclair 1998). Moreover, Young (1983) in-
dicated that consumers respond to price rises and decreases diﬀerently. Based on
British survey data, Townsend (1987) discovered that the consumption patterns of
cigarettes are heterogeneous across social classes. The price elasticity is relatively
higher for low-income recipients. The amount of cigarettes smoked is related neg-
atively to individual income. In addition, the impacts of taxation and advertising
vary with income levels. In countrywide studies, the price elasticity is found to be
higher among less developed economies than in industrialized nations (e.g., Warner
1990, Chapman and Richardson 1990, and Chaloupka et al. 2000). Recently, re-
searchers have suggested that a nonlinear relationship exists between income and
cigarette consumption. Huang and Yang (2006) were among the ﬁrst to emphasize
threshold eﬀects with respect to cigarette demand.
The evidence highlights the importance of nonlinearities and threshold eﬀects
in the dynamics of cigarette demand. In order to investigate further the dynamics
of addictive consumption across income groups, we apply the threshold model
developed by Hansen (1999) in dynamic panels to US state-level data for cigarette
consumption. To date, dynamic versions of Hansen’s panel threshold model have
been employed in several applications; for example, Huang and Yang (2006) for
cigarette demand, Graﬀ and Karmann (2006) and Masten et al. (2008) for the
ﬁnance–growth nexus, Ho (2006) on growth convergence, and Shen and Chen (2008)
on the causality between banking and currency fragilities.2 Our study diﬀers from
1See Goel and Nelson (2006) for a review.
2Another possible extension is to specify a panel smooth threshold regression (PSTR), which,
instead of discrete shifts, allows the coeﬃcients to change gradually from one regime to another.
1existing studies in several aspects. First, the de-meaned treatment for ﬁxed eﬀects
is used commonly but may not be suitable for a dynamic panel threshold model;
this point is examined analytically in the Appendix. Second, unbalanced panel data
are accounted for explicitly in our estimation without deletion of any information.
Finally, we apply a bootstrap approach to correct for the small-sample bias that
arises in the dynamic panel threshold model with ﬁxed eﬀects.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses estimation issues and
potential inconsistency in the context of a dynamic panel threshold framework with
ﬁxed eﬀects. Section 3 outlines the empirical speciﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, we adopt a
myopic model of addiction to account for the persistence of smoking behavior. We
then report the results from our threshold estimation after adjusting for bias. Two
income thresholds deﬁne three distinct regimes in which the dynamics of addictive
behavior are addressed. Some econometric issues relevant to the estimation of a
dynamic panel threshold model with ﬁxed eﬀects are advanced in the Appendix.
2. Estimation
To investigate threshold-type behavior in cigarette demand, we extend Hansen’s
(1999) threshold model by allowing for lagged dependent variable regressors. That
is, we consider a dynamic panel threshold model. The issue of small-sample bias is
summarized in the Appendix. It turns out that bias correction is important to our
empirical results in this paper. First of all, after accounting for the threshold eﬀect
of income, the data in each regime become unbalanced. Second, the number of
observations in each regime determined by the threshold estimation may be as few
as 2 or 3 when T = 38 (years), in the sense that the LSDV (least squares dummy
variable) bias might not be ignorable in a dynamic panel threshold model. Finally,
the exogenous variables included in our regression model can further complicate
the bias approximations of the LSDV estimators.
2.1 The Dynamic Panel Data Model with Threshold Eﬀects
The appeal of threshold regression models is that the data stratiﬁcation can be de-
termined by the value of an observed variable as opposed to alternative choices
of a cutoﬀ point in a purely ad hoc fashion. The least squares (LS) estima-
tion and the corresponding asymptotic distribution theory are readily available in
Hansen (1999). The Hansen method provides a simpliﬁed econometric technique
for threshold regression with panel data; however, a major econometric limitation
of his approach is that when lagged dependent variables are used, the LSDV might
be severely biased. It is dangerous to apply Hansen’s method to dynamic panel
data directly without dealing with the LSDV bias.
See, for example, Fok et al. (2005), Gonz´ alez et al. (2005), Colletaz and Hurlin (2006), and
Fouquau et al. (2008).
2In this section, we apply a bootstrap method to correct for bias in dynamic
panel data, and then to determine possible regimes taking income as the threshold
variable. We deal explicitly with potential bias in the threshold estimation. The
model can be written as3
yit = αi + (β1yi,t−1 + xitη1)1(qit ≤ γ) + (β2yi,t−1 + xitη2)1(qit > γ) + eit, (1)
where, for i = 1,...,N, t = 1,...,T, yit is the dependent variable, xit is an m-
vector of explanatory variables. qit is the observed threshold variable, γ ∈ Γ is the
threshold parameter, Γ is the collection of potential threshold values, β1 and β2 are
m-vectors of slope parameters that may diﬀer depending on the value of qit, and
ei is the disturbance term. 1(qit ≤ γ) is an indicator variable that equals one if
qit ≤ γ and zero otherwise. Accordingly, 1(qit > γ) is deﬁned in a similar fashion.
Estimation of (1) involves three steps. First, the LS method (with bias cor-
rection) is employed to calculate the sum of squared residuals (SSR) in (1) at a
given γ ∈ Γ. Second, the estimator of the threshold value is γ, which generates
the smallest SSR. Finally, with the sample split by the estimated threshold, the
parameters of the equation can be estimated through the LS method (with bias
correction) in each regime of the samples.
2.2 The Bootstrap Bias Correction for Dynamic Panels
In this section, we use a simple example to illustrate the main idea of bootstrap-
based bias correction in the context of threshold models in dynamic panels and
then extend this to the case of a demand equation for cigarettes.
For a given γ ∈ Γ, we ﬁrst obtain ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates ˆ β1(γ) and ˆ β2(γ), and
then we calculate ˆ αi(γ) and residuals ˆ eit(γ) for all i’s and t’s. The bootstrap




iT(γ)) are drawn from
ˆ ei(γ) = (ˆ ei1(γ), ˆ ei2(γ),..., ˆ eiT(γ)) with replacement. Then, for i = 1,...,n, t =
−49,...,T, the bootstrap sample is generated by
y
∗
it(γ) = ˆ αi(γ) + ˆ β1(γ)y
∗
i,t−11(qit ≤ γ) + ˆ β2(γ)y
∗
i,t−11(qit > γ) + e
∗
it(γ).
The ﬁrst 49 observations are discarded, and then we use the remaining observations
to obtain ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates, β∗
1,b(γ) and β∗
2,b(γ). This procedure is repeated over
B = 400 times, and the bias-corrected estimators of β1 and β2 for a given γ are
deﬁned as
















3See Hansen (1999) for details on the technical issues and the statistical theory for threshold
estimation.
3The bias-corrected transition parameter is deﬁned as












˜ yit − ˆ β1,B(γ)˜ yi,t−11(qit ≤ γ) − ˆ β2,B(γ)˜ yi,t−11(qit > γ)
i2
.
Furthermore, the bias-corrected estimators are deﬁned as (ˆ β1,B, ˆ β2,B) = (ˆ β1,B(ˆ γB), ˆ β2,B(ˆ γB)).
Then, consider a dynamic panel model with exogenous variables as in equation
(1). For a given γ ∈ Γ, we obtain ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates ˆ β1(γ), ˆ β2(γ), ˆ η1(γ), and
ˆ η2(γ), and then we calculate ˆ αi(γ) and residuals ˆ eit(γ) for all i’s and t’s. The
bootstrap exogenous variables and errors for individual i, (x∗
i,e∗
i(γ)), are drawn
from (xit, ˆ eit(γ)) with replacement in pairs (i.e., (x∗
is,e∗
is) = (xiτ, ˆ eiτ), s = 1,...,T,
and τ is randomly drawn from {1,··· ,T} with replacement). Then, the bootstrap
sample is generated, and the bias-corrected transition parameter can be estimated
readily.
3. Empirical Results
In this paper, we estimate the demand function in the presence of a partial ad-
justment process; i.e., the myopic model of addiction; see Hamilton (1972) and
McGuinness and Cowling (1975) for a theoretical introduction. For empirical ap-
plications, see Baltagi and Levin (1986) and Baltagi et al. (2000). The demand
function for cigarette consumption of state i in period t across two regimes divided
by an income threshold can be expressed as in equation (1), where yit = lnCit,
xit = (lnDIit,lnADit,lnPit,LDTit,STIit,STEit).
State-speciﬁc and time-speciﬁc dummies are also incorporated into equation
(1). Cit is consumption measured by per capita tax-paid cigarette sales in packs
for state i. Pit is the average real retail price per pack in 1982–1984 dollars for
state i. DIit is real per capita disposable income for a speciﬁc state. ADit is
designed to capture state-speciﬁc advertising. The smuggling eﬀects across states
include: LDTit for commercial smuggling, STIit for import smuggling and STEit
for export smuggling.4 The β’s in equation (1) are expected to be positive, reﬂecting
the phenomenon of intertemporal complementarity in addictive consumption, as a
reduction in price raises consumption over time. The η parameters are negative,
except for the undetermined income and adverting eﬀects.
The data used in this study are obtained from Fenn et al. (2001). The panel
covers N = 50 states including the District of Columbia over T = 38 years (1957–
4See Becker et al. (1994) for the construction of these indexes.
41994), except for several states missing data for a few years.5 In total, there are
1874 observations available.
Prior to estimating the equation, we need to determine the correct number of
regimes to describe the underlying dynamics of cigarette demand. The likelihood
ratio (LR) test with the values from the bootstrap method is reported in Table 1.
The LR values indicate that distinct regimes can be identiﬁed using income as a
threshold. Having conﬁrmed that a single threshold is signiﬁcant at sensible levels,
the LR test is then conducted for multiple break points. As indicated in Table 1,
the test statistics are in support of three regimes with two income thresholds, over
four regimes. While the calculated LR statistics for two thresholds (three regimes)
in Table 1 far exceed the 5% critical value, three thresholds (four regimes) are not
signiﬁcant at any sensible level.
Table 2 reports the result of threshold estimation for cigarette demand.6 Specif-
ically, the table summarizes the estimates of the parameters of interest across dis-
tinct regimes with the associated t-statistics in parentheses. The ﬁrst column shows
the threshold values of income (denoted by b γ) along with the corresponding per-
centiles of income.
As expected, the signiﬁcant habit persistence eﬀects across income classes are
indicated by the positive lagged consumption coeﬃcients. Moreover, all three smug-
gling measures are negative and signiﬁcant, implying that the prevalence of boot-
legging, because of the variation in tax rates across states, reduces cigarette demand
within states. Three regimes associated with the threshold income levels are iden-
tiﬁed; namely, (1) below US$11288.89 (regime I); (2) between US$11288.89 and
US$11569.88 (regime II); (3) greater than US$11569.88 (regime III).7 The signif-
icant income thresholds suggest that smoking behavior varies by income level, in
that the three distinct income classes have diﬀerent responsiveness to the market
forces. For regime I, income levels below the 80.5 percentile, the estimated price
and income elasticities are −0.15 and 0.11, respectively, and both are signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. For regime II, these estimates are −0.31 and 0.54 and are signiﬁcant.
For regime III, the most wealthy group, the income eﬀect is 0.04 and signiﬁcant,
while the price eﬀect is marginal and not signiﬁcant. Our estimates of the price
5Because of data availability, several states have a diﬀerent starting year, although they all end
in 1994: Missouri (1958), Maryland (1961), Alaska and California (1962), Hawaii and Virginia
(1963), Colorado (1967), Oregon (1969) and North Carolina (1972). See Becker et al. (1994) for
detailed description of the sources and construction of the variables.
6Although the unadjusted estimates are similar qualitatively to those in Table 2, the estimates
of the given eﬀect tend to be biased. For example, without accounting for the estimation bias, the
price elasticity tends to be overestimated for all three income groups, whereas the income eﬀects
are likely to be underestimated. Thus, we attach stronger credence to the bootstrap estimates
with bias correction as shown in Table 2. The results without bias correction are available upon
request.
7The robustness of these threshold estimates is based on the bootstrap-based bias correction,
along with a number of speciﬁcation checks.
5and income elasticities lie in a plausible range and are similar in comparison to
estimates reported in the literature. The majority of the cigarette demand stud-
ies present a narrow range of price elasticities centered on −0.4 (Chaloupka and
Warner 2000), and income elasticities from 0.12 to 0.82 (Baltagi and Levin 1986).
The negative coeﬃcient on the advertising variable implies that an increase in
advertising expenditure by the cigarette industry may reduce the consumption of
cigarettes, which may reﬂect the net eﬀect of both demand and supply interactions.8
Our result suggests that the relative magnitude of the supply eﬀect of advertising
is higher. From the perspective of policy making, Wasserman et al. (1991) pointed
out that “...it is important to recognize that developing eﬀective and economically
eﬃcient policies to discourage smoking is inherently diﬃcult.” (p. 62) Our empirical
result in this paper provides a feasible explanation—the heterogeneity of smoking
dynamics across consumers. Thus, any antismoking proposals that are uniformly
imposed on all consumers are deemed to be a failure.
A few words are appropriate regarding the distribution of observations across
regimes. Table 3 summarizes the number of states corresponding to the speciﬁc
regime in chronological order. Prior to 1971, most of the states were in the ﬁrst
regime as the smoking behavior was fairly similar across states. Starting from
1971, a few states reached regimes II and III, which might be attributable to a
series of advertising restrictions enacted by the government, such as the Fairness
Doctrine Act and the US Broadcast Advertising Ban (Sloan et al. 2002, and Iwasaki
et al. 2006). Such marketing regulations and health warnings on cigarettes might
have changed public attitudes toward smoking; in particular, among the upper-
income class. A more than doubling of the number of states in regime III occurred
in 1984. The legislation of the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act requiring
rotating warnings on cigarette packages may be the main cause. Another sharp
break appeared in 1986, which coincided with the release of a US Surgeon General’s
report and the subsequent enactment of the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco
Health Education Act (Tauras et al. 2007). The evidence above seems to suggest
that government interventions play a crucial role in cigarette consumption.
8As pointed out by Iwasaki et al. (2006), advertising creates two parallel eﬀects on consump-
tion. An increase in persuasive advertising may induce higher demand for smoking and hence
higher consumption. Nevertheless, advertising can discourage price competition by increasing
oligopoly power, which in turn lowers cigarettes consumed (see Baltagi and Levin (1986) and the
references cited there for support of this view).
6Appendix
Small-Sample Bias and Within-Group Transformation for Dynamic Panel
Threshold Models
Because of the nature of habit persistence, previous studies on addictive sub-
stances are based largely on dynamic panel models. A typical feature of such panel
data is a small number of time dimensions (T = 38 in our study) and a moderate
number of individual (state) dimensions (N = 51). The estimation bias resulting
from the short (small T) and wide (large N) panels is likely to be signiﬁcant and
could have biased the empirical results. For example, Judson and Owen (1999)
argued that with the short time horizon of the panel, the LSDV that is used in the
dynamic panel models can produce biased estimates, which can be as large as 20%
above the true estimate of the coeﬃcient even when9 T = 30. Moreover, because
the likelihood of having an unbalanced panel may increase as the time dimension
becomes large, the empirical practice of excluding missing observations to main-
tain balanced panels may not be desirable (Bruno 2005). Judson and Owen (1999)
pointed out that the method of implementing corrected LSDV for an unbalanced
panel can produce superior results. In a recent work, Bruno (2005) extended the
LSDV bias approximations in Bun and Kiviet (2003) to unbalanced panels.
The traditional method used to estimate the transition parameters in nondy-
namic panel data models is based on the assumption that the estimators of the
slope parameters are consistent for a given value of γ ∈ Γ. Unfortunately, it is
well known that in dynamic panel data models with ﬁxed eﬀects, the possibility of
severe downward bias arises for the within-group estimators of the slope coeﬃcients
(in each regime) when T is small. Furthermore, because the threshold eﬀects will
make the data in each regime unbalanced and discontinuous, it is likely that the
bias is signiﬁcant when the average length of time for any regime is short even
though T is large. As a result, it is critical to adjust for the bias in estimation.
Although the bias corrections in Bun and Kiviet (2003) can be applied readily to
the case of unbalanced panels, as discussed below, they cannot be applied directly
to the dynamic panel threshold model with ﬁxed eﬀects.
In the conventional approach to bias correction for dynamic panel data models,
yit can be decomposed into two parts: a function of eit,ei,t−1,... and a function
of αi. Utilizing the within-group operator (i.e., yit − (1/T)
PT
t=1 yit) can eliminate
the second part to simplify the analytic form of the bias at the rate of 1/T. With
the threshold eﬀects, however, the second part depends not only on αi, β1 and
β2 but also on how the regime switches from one to another. The within-group
operator cannot fully remove this part in the panel model with threshold eﬀects,
even though the bias of the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator of the slope coeﬃcient in each
regime still diminishes at the rate of 1/T. In addition, because diﬀerent individuals
9Although Nickell (1981) suggested that the bias in the LSDV estimate can be eliminated as
T approaches inﬁnity; however, such long-span data in smoking addiction studies are rare.
7generally have diﬀerent switching times, the analytic form of the ﬁrst-order bias
approximation also varies from case to case. To avoid this diﬃculty in bias cor-
rection, we apply the renovated method based on an application of the bootstrap
estimation.10
We next illustrate brieﬂy that in the presence of threshold eﬀects, the con-
ventional approach to bias correction for the within-group estimator becomes in-
tractable. In particular, the within-group estimator for the dynamic panel thresh-
old model is not the same as that for a simple dynamic panel model and is a
function of E[α2].
Consider the following simple dynamic panel model with a structure change at
time 1 < S < T for i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,T,
yit = αi + eit + β1yi,t−11(t ≤ S) + β2yi,t−11(t > S),
where αi indicates individual ﬁxed eﬀects, eit ∼ N(0,σ2) is cross-sectionally and
serially independent, and βj, j = 1,2, denotes the AR(1) coeﬃcient, |βj| < 0.
Suppose that k = S/T is a strictly positive real number between zero and
one. Without loss of generality, here we assume that y0 = αi/(1 − β1). Let
xi1,t = yi,t−11(t ≤ S), xi2,t = yi,t−11(t > S), and let Xi = (Xi1,Xi2), where
Xij = (xij,1,...,xij,T)0, j = 1,2. This can be written as
Xi1 = (yi,0,...,yi,S−1,0,...,0),
Xi2 = ( 0 ,..., 0 ,yi,S,...,yi,T).











































10Alternatively, we can adopt the GMM estimation for our empirical estimation; however, it
should be noted that the bias of the GMM estimator for simple dynamic panel data usually
diminishes at the rate of 1/N (see, for example, Alvarez and Arellano 2003). Thus, it can be
expected that the GMM estimator for a dynamic panel threshold model becomes feasible only if
the number of individuals (N) is large enough.
8Note that S = kT. After employing the within-group transformation on Xi1,






























Unlike a dynamic panel data model, we CANNOT remove αi in Xi1 completely by







































Q as N → ∞. As a result, E[α2
i] would appear in the bias function through Q.
More importantly, for the dynamic panel threshold model, the bias correction
procedure is further complicated by the fact that in most cases, the cutoﬀ points
vary across individuals, and hence this is evidently going to become rather in-
tractable.
9Table 1: Test for threshold eﬀects (ﬁxed eﬀects)
LR-test P-value 10% CV 5% CV 1% CV
Two regimes 60.68 0.67% 16.36 25.12 58.59
Three regimes 134.19 1.33% 65.76 76.62 135.75
Four regimes 91.46 56.67% 170.90 195.36 259.27
Note: The critical values (CV) are obtained by the bootstrap method.
Table 2: Bootstrap estimation results (ﬁxed eﬀects)
b γ lnCt−1 lnDI lnAD lnP LDT STI STE
0.72 0.11 -0.06 -0.15 -0.05 -0.31 -0.18
(50.60) (9.37) (-13.18) (-8.82) (-5.48) (-3.57) (-4.60)
11288.89 [80.5%] 0.35 0.54 -0.08 -0.31 -0.01 0.17 -0.42
(11.47) (15.70) (-11.93) (-6.43) (-0.47) (0.44) (-2.07)
11569.88 [84%] 0.78 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.08 -0.53 -0.15
(36.21) (1.81) (-10.08) (-0.54) (-1.97) (-7.13) (-1.80)
Note: b γ denotes the estimated values of the income thresholds. The threshold values are in
US dollars followed by income percentiles in brackets. The numbers in parentheses denote
t-statistics.
10Table 3: Distribution of regimes in chronology
Year\regime I II III Year\regime I II III
1957 42 0 0 1976 45 2 4
1958 43 0 0 1977 44 2 5
1959 43 0 0 1978 41 4 6
1960 43 0 0 1979 41 2 8
1961 44 0 0 1980 43 2 6
1962 46 0 0 1981 45 0 6
1963 48 0 0 1982 45 1 5
1964 48 0 0 1983 41 5 5
1965 48 0 0 1984 38 1 12
1966 48 0 0 1985 34 3 14
1967 49 0 0 1986 31 0 20
1968 49 0 0 1987 29 2 20
1969 50 0 0 1988 27 4 20
1970 50 0 0 1989 23 5 23
1971 49 1 0 1990 23 3 25
1972 48 2 1 1991 21 5 25
1973 45 1 5 1992 20 4 27
1974 44 3 4 1993 17 3 31
1975 46 1 4 1994 15 2 34
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